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REPORT OF ThE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF ThE 
NEThERLANDS ASSOCIATION FOR COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCy LAw
Merel Heilbron, LLM & Ben Schuijling, LLM, PhD candidates at Radboud 
University Nijmegen, Faculty of Law.
1.  Introduction
The Netherlands Association for Comparative and International 
Insolvency Law (NACIIL, in dutch: Nederlandse Vereniging voor 
Rechtsvergelijkend en Internationaal Insolventierecht, or NVRII) 
decided to organize its second annual meeting on 8 November 2012 
around the topic of “Corporate Rescue”. This theme has been at the 
heart of recent developments, such as INSOL Europe’s proposal for 
a European Rescue Plan and the amendment of German insolvency 
law as of March 2012 in order to further facilitate the restructuring 
of companies (Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von 
Unternehmen).
The main part of the programme consisted of the presentation of and 
discussion on the reports prepared by Stephan Madaus (professor 
of Civil Law, Civil Procedure and Insolvency Law at the University of 
Regensburg) and Robert van Galen (partner at Nauta dutilh and 
member of the board of NACIIL). The meeting was chaired by Marcel 
Windt (partner at houthoff Buruma). 
2.  Madaus - Rescuing companies involved in insolvency  
 proceedings with rescue plans
The contribution of Stephan Madaus focused on two recommendations 
for the development of insolvency law. his first recommendation is to 
actively involve shareholders in the process of plan negotiations and 
voting and his second recommendation is to create a distinguished 
set of rules for insolvency cases initiated by the debtor by presenting 
a prepared or even pre-voted rescue plan, a so-called “fast track 
insolvency”. Madaus concluded with remarks on the latest German 
insolvency reform act and the ideas of INSOL Europe regarding rescue 
plans.
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Equity interest in insolvency and reorganisation proceedings
A reorganisation plan may not only provide for a virtual sale of the 
debtor’s business (asking creditors to agree on a fixed payoff much 
less than the face value of their claims), but also may involve a more 
sophisticated solution by providing for a restructuring of secured credit 
as well as the restructuring of ownership in companies (e.g. a debt-
to-equity-swap). Consequently, the way to involve equity interests 
in insolvency proceedings has become widely discussed. Madaus 
points out that a modern reorganisation law seems imperfect without 
the ability to address this topic directly. Equity interests are often 
subordinated according to the absolute priority rule (APR). This gives 
creditors the power to make the final decision without shareholders 
consent. 
Madaus believes there are good reasons to take another approach. 
If the debtor is a company and the plan provides for the impairment 
of equity interests, equity holders should be allowed to participate in 
negotiating a rescue plan and voting on a proposed plan.
If the majority of equity holders vote against such a plan, the plan can 
only be confirmed by a cram-down rule if it is fair and equitable by 
giving them a fair share of the surplus value realised by the plan. The 
plan should also be drawn up and negotiated in good faith. Considering 
creditors’ rights, the best-interest-test will have to be completed. This 
means that no (dissenting) creditor receives a payment under the plan 
that is less than it would have received in a liquidation of the company 
in an insolvency proceeding. Besides these conditions, there is no need 
for a strict APR to protect creditors from equity in a reorganisation. 
In reaction to a question of Yanying Li (Leiden University) Madaus 
clarified his view on the “fair and equitable” standard. The 
reorganization plan should be fair to all classes impaired. This means 
that the creditors should receive at least the liquidation value of the 
company (also known as the “best-interest-test”) and that equity 
holders should be protected in their choice to continue the company 
(the “debtor’s choice”). If this basic level is upheld, a plan should be 
held fair and equitable. Beyond that, the distribution of extra value is 
open to arrangements, negotiations and consent. 
Madaus’ proposition is based on the argument that equity interests 
are not part of the debtor’s estate and thus not part of the creditors’ 
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entitlement under insolvency law. While the creditors decide on 
the discharge of old debt, the owners of a business decide on the 
continuation of the business. Any reorganisation surplus value 
following from the continuation of the business in its contractual 
environment can only be realised in cooperation between the creditors 
and equity holders. furthermore, there is no good reason to apply the 
APR in such reorganisations. Madaus argues that the APR does not 
fit in reorganisation scenarios, nor does it promote corporate rescue. 
Rather, it gives owners and management every reason to stay out of 
insolvency proceedings as long as they can, making reorganisation 
impossible in many cases. 
The argument that equity interests are not part of the creditors’ 
entitlement was questioned by Rolef de Weijs (houthoff Buruma). 
In the discussion that followed Madaus stressed his view that an 
insolvency proceeding does not provide creditors with more rights 
with regard to the equity interest. Although it might be preferable to 
create extra value for the creditors without the possibility that equity 
will block this, the rights of investors deserve serious protection. As 
demonstrated in case law by European courts, insolvency in itself is not 
a reason to put the rights of equity holders aside.
In reaction to a question by Rolf Verhoeven (ABN AMRO) Madaus 
indicated that the participation of old equity in the reorganisation 
could take many shapes or forms. first, the equity holders must be 
willing to continue the business. Second, the aim should be to have 
all equity invest in the reorganisation, as well as new investors and 
creditors. 
Xinyi Gong (Leiden University) raised the issue of considering some 
form of protection for potential investors in a reorganisation. In 
Madaus’ view, special protection for new investors would be difficult 
to arrange. To create an incentive to invest in a reorganization one 
could give priorities to new investors for a limited period of time.
Fast track insolvency
The second major topic concerned the need for fast track proceedings 
to confirm prepared rescue plans. Madaus distinguishes the common 
scenario of an unprepared insolvency from the scenario of a failed out-
of-court workout and prepared insolvency. A negotiated rescue plan 
may have the support of a majority of creditors and equity holders, but 
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may fail to find consensual support. According to Madaus, insolvency 
law should provide a regulation for both scenarios. In a failed work-out 
case, the rescue plan may be declared binding on every creditor or 
equity holder through a confirmation proceeding. Such a proceeding 
can be implemented as a special proceeding for work-out cases, 
such as the British Scheme of Arrangement, the french procédure de 
sauvegarde or the German procedure under § 5 of the Gesetz über 
Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen. 
Madaus recommends that plan voting should take place outside of 
insolvency as well as outside of special court-supervised proceedings. 
Obtaining a majority-vote, subsequent confirmation proceedings 
would only consist of a confirmation hearing quickly followed by 
a confirmation order. To ensure fast implementation, a stay of 
proceedings during appeal should only be granted in exceptional cases 
of disproportionate and irreversible harm to a single opposing creditor, 
equity holder or the debtor. The task of judicial confirmation of such 
fast track proceedings should be assigned to insolvency courts as these 
courts are specialised and experienced in deciding whether a rescue 
plan is fair and equitable to all it will bind. Yet to prevent the stigma 
of insolvency, the confirmation proceedings could be called “rescue 
proceedings” or “confirmation proceedings”,must provide for a debtor 
in possession and ensure for as little interruption of the debtor’s 
business as possible. 
German Insolvency Reform Act 2012 (ESUG) and the idea of a 
European Rescue Plan
Madaus then applied his thoughts on a model reorganisation law on 
modern German insolvency law and INSOL Europe’s proposal for a 
European Rescue Plan (ERP). 
German insolvency law has been amended as of March 2012 in order 
to further facilitate the restructuring of companies. The insolvency 
code now provides for participation of equity in plan proceedings. To 
Madaus’ regret, equity holders’ vote can be overturned by creditors’ 
vote in a cram down based on the absolute priority rule. The reform 
act also improved the debtor’s chance to be appointed as debtor in 
possession. however, the law still does not guarantee for a debtor’s 
right to stay in possession during prepared insolvency proceedings as, 
finally and most significantly, the reform failed to introduce protection 
for prepared insolvency cases.
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Erik Boerma (Judge with the district Court of Breda) drew attention to 
the current lack of reorganization plans in the Netherlands. According 
to Madaus, the situation has been very similar in Germany. The total 
number of reorganization plans has been low and recent reform aimed 
to raise these numbers. So far however, most corporate rescues have 
been realized through a going concern liquidation sale by auction. 
Madaus concluded his presentation with a brief remark on INSOL 
Europe’s proposal for a European Rescue Plan to be added to a 
revised version of the European Insolvency Regulation. Although 
Madaus supports the basic idea of such a rescue plan, he is opposed 
to applying the absolute priority rule against equity interest in the 
case of a reorganisation plan. furthermore, the proposal should waive 
unnecessary court hearings, allow voting in writing and restrict the 
staying effect of appeals for all jurisdictions. Moreover, the proposal 
should allow  fast track proceedings with little effect on debtor’s 
business and management in prepared cases, while providing for full 
administration in prepared cases.
3.  Van Galen - Insolvent groups of companies in cross  
 border cases and rescue plans
The presentation of Robert van Galen mainly concerned two topics. 
firstly, Van Galen described five different regimes and four different 
scenarios of dealing with group insolvencies within the European 
Union. Secondly, Van Galen addressed the European Rescue Plan as 
proposed by INSOL Europe. As a preliminary remark Van Galen pointed 
out that the situation in the European Union is somewhat special. On 
the one hand, there is the principle of community trust, which under 
the European Insolvency Regulation entails that member states should 
trust decisions taken by courts in other member states. In this regard, 
there is a difference with cross border cases where there no such trust 
exists. On the other hand the EU situation differs from a domestic 
situation because a COMI is designated  which may cause a shift in the 
law applicable to the insolvency. 
Five regimes of dealing with group insolvencies
Van Galen started by distinguishing five different regimes of dealing 
with group insolvencies. The first regime is based on coordination 
between courts. Although there are several sets of rules and guidelines 
on coordination, it is still a rather weak instrument. It can easily be 
overruled by national laws and cannot overcome the problem that 
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trustees of subsidiaries may exploit hold out positions in the interest of 
their own creditors. The second regime is based on coordination powers 
for the trustee of the main proceedings. It is required that one of the 
proceedings is designated as the group main proceedings, probably 
that of the parent company. The trustee of the main proceedings has 
powers in the subsidiaries’ insolvencies. The court of the subsidiary 
probably decides on such requests. This the regime favored by INSOL 
Europe. The third regime consists of the appointment of a mutual 
trustee in all group proceedings. This may be an efficient option, but 
there are some disadvantages in the sense that conflicts of interest 
between the companies within the group would have to be handled 
by one and the same liquidator. Also, the mutual trustee might have 
to deal with different laws, languages and legal cultures which may 
hinder effective communication with the courts. Therefore, it should 
not be the standard solution according to Van Galen. The fourth 
option is a joint administration regime. If this would entail that the 
law of the bankruptcy court applies, there would be a shift in the law 
applicable to the insolvency proceedings of the individual companies 
of the group. On the other hand, applying the law of the individual 
subsidiaries would burden the court. The fifth and final regime is 
based on substantive consolidation. All the assets and liabilities will be 
thrown on a pile and are no longer attributed to individual companies. 
The general view is that this should rather be the exception than the 
rule.
Van Galen then elaborated on the second regime of the liquidator 
with coordinating powers. Under such a regime four restructuring 
scenarios are possible according to Van Galen. A coordinated asset 
sale by the individual group companies provides the first scenario. The 
trustee with coordinating powers can, for example, ask the court of 
the subsidiary proceedings to suspend any asset sale by the trustee 
of the subsidiary. The former can then try to agree on a coordinated 
sale with the trustees of the individual companies. however, it might 
be difficult to align all trustees and courts in the various insolvencies 
of companies of the group. A second scenario is a coordinated rescue 
plan with respect to the individual group companies. for example, the 
liquidator of the group main proceedings can propose rescue plans in 
all subsidiary proceedings. This might be very difficult to achieve and 
serious limitations may be posed by national law. A  is a third option. 
The liquidator of the parent company would have the power to sell all 
or part of the assets of the group. There may however be conflicts of 
interests between (creditors of) the different group companies. A final 
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scenario is one consolidated plan for the whole group. The proposal 
for the European Rescue Plan (ERP) by INSOL Europe is based on this 
idea. 
European Rescue Plan
The European Rescue Plan is a specimen of a consolidated plan for 
the whole group of companies in different jurisdictions. Adoption of 
the plan takes place under the supervision of the court of the main 
proceedings of the parent company. Under the ERP, creditors are 
placed in classes and each class votes on the plan. The interests of 
the different classes should essentially be the same. If all classes 
accept the plan, the court will confirm the plan. If a creditor opposes 
confirmation, the court will still confirm, unless:
 i.   the plan unfairly favors one or more creditors, or
 ii.  the creditor receives less value than he would receive 
in a liquidation (the best interest test), or
 iii. the plan is not feasible. 
If one or more classes do not accept the plan, the court will decide on 
a cram down. INSOL Europe has accepted the absolute priority rule in 
this respect. from this rule follows that no cram down may take place if 
a lower ranking creditor would receive anything under the plan whilst 
a higher ranking creditor does not receive full value (he is “impaired”). 
however the meaning of this rule is limited because with respect to 
different creditors of different companies, it is not possible to say that 
one creditor is higher ranking than another. Therefore, a rule has been 
added that a rejection by a class can only be overruled if the rejection 
was not in good faith. 
The procedure of the ERP has three stages. In short, first the trustee 
of the group main proceedings submits the plan, an information 
memorandum and the class schedule to the court. This is followed by 
an acceptance hearing. The court decides on recognition of the claims 
that are disputed and it will establish a definite class schedule. After 
that, creditors will vote on the plan. With respect to creditors that 
have rejected the plan, the court will decide on cram down. As a third 
stage, the court will confirm the plan unless a creditor or shareholder 
opposes confirmation. The court will then apply the best interest test, 
the feasibility test and the test whether the plan unfairly favors one or 
more creditors or shareholders. 
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Van Galen then responded to the objections to the ERP raised by prof. 
Madaus. first and foremost, Madaus is of the opinion that the APR 
should not only be absent at the confirmation test (as it is under the 
ERP), but also at cram down. This would enable equity’s involvement. 
however, according to Van Galen, the fact that the APR is absent when 
a class accepts the plan gives the different classes enough opportunity 
to bargain over any surplus value. In Van Galen’s view, in insolvency 
proceedings equity is absent and it is up to the creditors to decide 
whether equity is still allowed to retain something. The fact that the 
creditors are placed in classes that have more or less the same interest 
justifies this. The question whether the court will overrule a rejecting 
class must be seen in the key of abuse of right. In a group of companies 
it can be hard to establish a ranking order between the creditors, so 
then the court must apply the test whether the rejection is in good 
faith. 
In response to Madaus’ submission that one (confirmation) hearing 
is sufficient, Van Galen explained that eliminating the acceptance 
hearing would imply that the court would decide on classification after 
knowing the outcome of the voting. This could sway the court towards 
a more plan-friendly attitude. 
The role of equity
Marcel Windt and Reinout Vriesendorp (Tilburg University and de 
Brauw Blackstone Westbroek) asked prof. Madaus whether he had 
taken the economic perspective into account when proposing to give 
shareholders a permanent role in a reorganization. Prof. Madaus 
explained that in his view, the economic perspective is a too one-sided 
view on a reorganization. There is no justification not to apply the legal 
rules outside of insolvency to the company in a reorganization. This 
is confirmed by the European Court of Justice, as well as the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, who would judge that the membership 
rights of shareholders have to be considered, even if they are out of 
the money, as they are protected by the constitution or EU directives. 
Rolef de Weijs brought up the question whether the fact that equity 
brings new value to the company is a prerequisite for equity to be 
allowed to keep some value. Also, de Weijs asked if it was indeed 
the case that under present German law, equity does not have any 
bargaining power. Madaus explained that it is not a condition for equity 
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to bring value to the table. In his view, there should not be a cram down 
only because equity is out, but that in stead the fair and equitable test 
should be applied. If a cram down is in accordance with the fair and 
equitable standard, the dissent of equity can be overturned by a judge. 
The role of the judiciary
Erik Boerma was wondering how the many courts in Europe can be 
coordinated. When applying the ERP, how can we make sure that every 
court in the European Union would decide in the same manner and 
how are these decision made accessible? Robert van Galen answered 
that the trustee of the parent company has certain powers with respect 
to the subsidiaries. he can propose a group plan, but no proposals for 
coordination between courts are included in there. The reason for that 
is that a group of INSOL Europe is still discussing this matter. It would 
be harder to attain than the ERP, because the latter only applies in a 
limited number of cases, namely group cases in multiple jurisdictions. 
Therefore a plan for coordination between courts has not been put 
forward by INSOL Europe up until now. 
The future of the ERP
Bob Wessels (Leiden University) then posed a practical question to each 
of the day’s speakers: the first about the chances of success of the ERP 
to make it through the European Commission, and the second on the 
success of reorganization plans in Germany so far. Madaus answered to 
the second question that there were no numbers yet, because the new 
law (ESUG) has only been in force for six months. So far, the two cases 
that he is aware of regarded small family businesses. It is expected that 
in January or february 2013 the first results of the insolvency plans will 
be published by the courts. In response to the first question Van Galen 
answered that INSOL Europe opted to draft provisions that represent 
the best way forward. INSOL Europe preferred to start the debate 
about the optimal solution for a European plan rather than not have a 
debate at all. If the proposal will not make it into legislation this time, 
it may be taken into account in the next round, regarding the fact that 
the Commission has to evaluate the regulation every five years.
On 12 december 2012, not long after the annual meeting of the 
NACIIL, the European Commission published its proposal for 
amending the European Insolvency Regulation. The Commission has 
not adopted INSOL Europe’s suggestion for a European Rescue Plan. 
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Rather, the proposal focuses on a regime of intensified coordination 
and communication between courts and liquidators in case of an 
insolvency of a group of companies.83 
4. Concluding remarks
The need for fast track corporate rescue proceedings and a solution for 
cross-border insolvencies of groups of companies is clear. The future 
developments of this area of insolvency law are both challenging and 
exciting. Prof. Madaus and Van Galen provided the NACIIL with valuable 
reports on corporate rescue and the cross-border reorganization of 
groups of companies. Their presentations and the lively debate that 
followed formed the heart of another successful annual meeting of 
the NACIIL.
83  See the proposal for amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on  
 insolvency proceedings, 2012/0360 (COd), Chapter IVa, Article 42a ff. 
